

THE HISTORY OF THE Negociations FOR A TREATY OF PEACE

The Breaking Off of the Conference

10. **St. Germay** de **Verdun**, filio **gaudens** sed pietatis
11. **Y** e **de** **Verdun** **ca** **re** **de** **la** **bas** **de** **la** **ro**
12. **I** **die** **de** **la** **mo** **n** **s** **d** **e** **R** **R**

The Fourth LETTER

Tory-Member.

Orem Domine Pater iste uenit uero. Tunc ni no
tum Procul hinc tam Federis filii nubus sac
erit illud uero. Tunc uenit uero. Tunc uenit uero.

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YЯOTГИИ

Jan. 10. 1711.

SIR, Negociations

I Fear you begin to wish you had kept your De
to your self, and not ask'd my Opinion upon M
ters that have grown under my Pen so much before
the compas, which I at first hop'd they wou'd ha
come within your patience once more, and this was
the last time I will trouble you with my Thoughts upon
the Management either of War or Peace, till you
again make it your own Request, to whom I can re
nothing. To come then to the Business, and resum
Subject where my last left off ; I shall give you in
the best Account I can, of what was done in relation
Peace, from the breaking off of the Conferences at
~~Hague~~, to the end of those that were held the Year
ter at Gertruydenberg ; that is, from June the 9th 1710
to July the 25th 1710. And that you may have
distinct View of this Affair, it may not be amiss to
divide this Space of Time into three Parts ; and con
First, what pass'd from the Return of Monsieur Roux
to Monsieur Prikun's Journey to Paris, which was ab
the middle of November. Secondly, what Progress
made in this Affair, between that Journey and the
rival of the Marquis de Uxelles and the Abbé de Poligny
the French Plenipotentiaries, at Gertruydenberg : And
give you in the Third place, some Account of the
negotiations during their stay there ; since which no
advances have been made on either side in this grand
fair.

First, For what pass'd between the Conferences at
~~Hague~~, and Monsieur Prikun's Journey to Paris, you kn
without my telling you, that the Negotiations did

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irely eas'd with these Conferences, but were still
at lip, and carry'd on by an intercourse of Letters,
between Monsieur de Rum and the Marquis de Torcy; to
it an Expediency cou'd be found out, for the 37th Art-
c, the Difficultie in that Article being the only Point
whitch the Conferencees, in appearance at least, were
ke off. The Prince they offer'd to satisfy the Allies in
that the King of France shou'd not directly nor lar-
gely affil his Grandson, & to have him judge of the
importance of this Point, as when I haye laid it in my last
Letter, and by that for that the recovery of Spain, and
the Duke's dependance entirely dependt upon it. For if the King of
France supports the Duke of Anjou, all the Efforts the
Enemies can make against him, will be so in purpose since
they can send more Men and Money to Spain in a
month, than they can do in a Twelvemonth; but if the
King of France will in good earnest withdraw all All-
iance from him, then a Spanish War would be but a
short Busines, since in that Case, there can be no doubt,
that in a little time the Da. of Anjou wou'd be content
to laye the Spaniard, as they accidently wou'd find it for
Interest to leave him. Now, the more important this
is, the more are the others encreas'd to insist upon
certain Security, say to be desivies, and all that
particular to the Part of France, either in former
Treaties, or in the last Conferences, give them but too
Reason to think, they can never be cauous enough,
they trust to perfidious Princes in an Affair of so much
Consequence. And if you carry these Vices with you
in your Thoughtes upon this Subject, you can easily take
with their foolish and glibblets Insinuations, who
will peruate you, that the Allies have been so diffi-
cult upon the same Foot with them whitch Monsieur
de Rum had propos'd, as item himselfe in the Day before
de Rum left the Hague. That three Threes should
put into the Hands of the Allies, 150000. Souldiers, to
which when the Affairs of Spain, Scandaglio, be desivies,
was the nature of the Empathie in question; and
nothing can draw better the Readines of the Allies to
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put an End to the War, and the sincerity of France, the
what part between them upon this Subject. The Towns
to be given up for this purpose must have been either in
Spain, or on the Borders of it, or on the side of the Pyrenees,
or in Flanders. Whatever cou'd have been done of
this kind, was but a poor Expedient for an Article of
much Consequence; and had the King of France been
Earnest, one can't think he would have made any propo-
sition to give the Allies what they were willing to accept.
But as he meant nothing less, than what he was so
ward to promise, there was no Security of this sort, which
Allies could ask, which he did not think too much to
grant.

As for Towns in Spain, which was the last Security
and most to the purpose, that Expedient had been pro-
pos'd as I told you in my last, during the Conference
the Hague, and was by the French Ministers refus'd; And
to prevent the Allies from persisting in this Demand,
King soon after put it out of his power to comply
at; otherwise his people, as blind as they are, cou'd
have had any great opinion of his Sincerity by the
fines he express'd for Peace, while he rejected a Con-
dition that was so natural for the Allies to ask, and
only possible, but easy for him to grant, and which
Safety and Interest of France, as distinct from Spain,
no way concerned in. That the Negotiations then
might not continue to rest upon this Point, he took
immediately, that there should be no more force used
Allies to insist on this Demand; and to that end
drew his Troops out of all the Spanish Fortresses,
did afterwards out of the Kingdom, upon pretence
indeed, of evacuating Spain according to the Preliminary
Articles. But that was only a Pretence for he kept
there all the Summer, to be at hand to assist the
Army in case his Army should be attack'd. If Britain
should be made into a Fragment, that General, the
General that commanded them, had Orders not to ventur
Battle, but to be on the defensive, as appear'd upon
Duke of BURGUNDY coming to his Army upon the Subsidy
of BULAGNY by the Allies, and expositularing with M. de la

the Royal Bezons for not joining upon that Occasion the Spanish Army; for which he justify'd himself, by producing the King's Orders. By this middle way the King thought he shou'd deceive the Allies, without abandoning the Spaniards: and in the mean time, the Duke of Anjou, according to the Direction of French Councils, made his utmost Efforts to put Spain into a Condition to defend it self, as if they were in earnest to expect no farther Assistance from France: which had so good an Effect on the Spaniards, that they exerted themselves beyond what shou'd be expected of them: They compleated in a little time their old Regiments, and rais'd besides a great many new ones; and the most vigorous Measures were taken to curst and Money, and erect Magazines, as if they were to stand, for the future, on their own Bottom; tho' the King of France was far from intending they shou'd want his ASSISTANCE, when their AFFAIRS call'd for it. And that his Grandson might not want a general for his Army, 'twas publickly talk'd at Paris, before Monsieur Rouille's Return, that in case of a Peace, the Duke of Berwick had desir'd Leave to resign his Baton Mareschal of France, that he might go and command Spain: Which shews us how the Duke of Anjou might have Officers as well as Men from France, if he had any want of them.

If therefore the King of France withdrew his Troops, was not with a Design to leave his Grandson to himself, upon very different Views; 'twas to make the Allies and his own People believe he was sincere, and that he was willing to remove, as far as he cou'd, all Difficulties in the way to Peace; and yet, at the same Time, and by the same Action, increase the Difficulties he wou'd seem to remove, by rendering by this means, the most reasonable Demand of the Allies impracticable: besides that he really wanted these Troops himself, against another year, the Danger he was threaten'd with in Flanders, obliging him to have a more numerous Army on that side. This was His meaning, by withdrawing his Troops from Spain, and therefore he did not do it, till he had put the Duke of Anjou's Affairs upon a pretty good Foot, and

and he was sure, there cou'd be no immediate Want of them, the Campaignt there being at an end. And that this Removal of his Troops might be of the least Injustice possible to his Grandson, he contriv'd that as many of his own Troops shou'd desert, as wou'd make sevene eight Battalions ; and to supply the place of the rest, far he cou'd, he sent his Grandson all the Walloon Regiments from Flanders ; from whence they began their March for Spain the beginning of the February following, which was as soon as Money, Arms and Cloathes cou'd be provided for them. And not content with giving the Duke of Anjou this Assistance, and supplying him with great Stores of Ammunition ; because new rare Troops cou'd not be much depended on, the King, having many of the Troops he withdrew in Rouffion upon the Borders of Spain, to be ready to return, when his Grandson's Affairs shou'd make it necessary. And is not it very like the Conduct of one who means in earnest to abandon Spain, and wou'd restore it to the House of Austria, if he cou'd ? but poor Man, he can't do Impossibilities. 'Tis a pretty way to facilitate the Reduction of Kingdom, to make it as Difficult as possible ; a great sin of Sincerity to put things out of our Power, which we can't without discovering our Insincerity, keep in it, and mighty reasonable to create Impossibilities, and then complain of them. Who can help believing such a Man when he tells you, he wou'd with all his Heart, to procure a Peace, give up the Spanish Monarchy, if he could, but that he really can't ; and that this is the only hindrance ? Or what Pledge of his Good-will is there, or may not expect from him, as a Caution, that he wou'd directly or indirectly hinder your doing, what he can possibly himself do for you ? To expect a valuable Pledge from a Man, to be return'd to him when that is done, which he intends never shall be done ; is a great Mistake : therefore since the French King has so plainly discover'd this Intention, you must set no wonder, he makes those Difficulties in settling an Expedition, as you cou'd not expect in a Man who means one word of what he says.

The first and only good Expedient you see, is makeable upon purpose that it may not be inflicted on y
nese host, warred upon us, the Friends of the Allies,
the French Towns on the Frontier of Spain, such as
Perpignan, which would have enabled the
ies to send Forces to Spain with infinitely less expence
Trouble, and in a quarter of the time they can now
at the same time have oblig'd the Fr. pretty effectu
to keep their Promise, not to assist the Duke of An
by cutting off in great measure the Communication
ween France and Spain. This was an Expedition which
King cou'd not say he was not in his Power to com
with; but when one has not a mind to do a thing, it
is so easie to find out a reason for not doing it.
his cou'd not be said to be an impossible Expedition,
as easy to pretend, that it did not suit either with the
erty or Dignity of France to put the Keys of his King
into the Hands of the Allies, since he cou'd not
sue what use they might make of them, or which he
d get them again. And this was very right sug
for a Man who never intended that shord be done,
ch is made the Condition, on which the Oath of
oys, shall be remov'd. If the King does not design
in should be quitted by his Grandson, it must be remov'd
would not be very prudent in him to give the Allies
important Places under the Notion of Garrison
o provinces, which must either defeat his Design or suppose
cou his Grandson, or if that Design succeed, you'd never
ight be demanded back of them: nor but that a Prince
y his known abilities would, we may, be lured, soon find
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Spain shord be tax'd, what Inconvenience wou
be in complying with this Expedient? What ill
ould the Allies make of it? Could they by the French
ese Towns hurt France before they had remov'd Spain?
it be imagin'd that wou'd not find them work enough
Or

Or is there any room to fear an Invasion from Spain, afterwards? No sure, however significant Spain may be in their Hands, it won't in h[er]e be very formidable out of them; they wou'd have too much Business in looking to themselves, to think of disturbing so powerful a Neighbour, and there wou'd be a thousand times more Reason for them to be afraid of France, than for France to apprehend any thing from them. Nor can there be the least Pretence for a Suspicion, that the Allies, if these Towns were on in their Hands, wou'd never part with them: I suppose the End answer'd, for which they were entrusted with them: for, besides that such a Breach of faith is without Example on the Side of the Allies, they can't for Reasons I gave you in my last, act a false part in this matter, if they wou'd, especially not on this Side of France, where, if the Allies had ever so much Justice on their Side, they cou'd not long support themselves under mighty Disadvantages with which they must make war on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have said in my first Letter of the Spanish War, which, with little Alteration, will hold here.

But there is no need of saying more, to shew you how ridiculous it is to pretend any Fears of the Allies, or else these Towns shou'd be put into their Hands; the supporting of Spain has France too dear, not to know the low Condition it is in, that nothing cou'd be greater madness in King Charles or his Allies, than not to sit down quietly in peace the Minute the Kingdom is reduc'd to his Obedience, without seeking for any Pretences to continue the War needlessly.

Nothing therefore can be brought to be the true Reason, why the King of France rejected this Expedient, & thus it has been intended the Allies shou'd obtain the End for which was ask'd; as you will still see more plainly in what follows. On the Side of Alsace, nothing was propos'd that I know of, but Thionville, a place of great Consequence to France, as there is any Danger from the Empire; but considering the miserable low Condition of that encrusted exhausted Body, one can hardly think the strong Places on that Side, are of no service to enable the French to invade the Empire, and would therefore be against Invasion from it. And what shou'd be at the

only was Pledge, shoud be to be reward, long before this Empire shoud be in a Condition to make any use of it, soe it would be either unjust in it self, or troublesome to France. But once never intending to fulfil the Condition on which the Union shoud be refus'd, this Proposal was rejected upon the Petitiones of the former.

Nothing now was left, but to seek for an expedient in which was what the French offer'd from the first, and all along pres'd, as if they were very much in earnest: But had they been so, 'tis very hard to have a good Reason, why an Expedient should be look'd here, rather than in any other part. The Allies, tho' they were sensible whatever cou'd be given on this Side, was but a poor Expedient at best; yet they were so entirely dispos'd to put an end to the War, that they wou'd absolutely reject it. Whatever Towns France cou'd

put into the Hands of the Allies on this Side, if they were not such as lie nearest to those that are to be given by the Preliminary, their Tenure would be very precarious, and it wou'd be very difficult to keep them when France had a mind to have them again. This may easily judge of, by the Impossibility the Allies were under last Campaign to make the Siege of Arras, while they left Doway behind them; and the Difficulties gave them in the Siege of Aire. But if those Revolutionary Towns were to be of those that lie nearest, they cou'd not be of so much Importance to France, as they shou'd not be willing to part with them to keep gain, since this wou'd only be making a little farther addition to the Barrier of the Netherlands, as I hinted my last, which wou'd secure them more from France, as bad an Equivalent as this was at the best. The French refus'd to make it as good as they cou'd, by ex. knowing some Towns which were of most Consequence, as Doway, Aire, and Cambrey; which wou'd lay theem open to an Invasion from the Allies: which if the Allies were able to make, they knew their own Designes shou'd give but too just a Handle for; besides, they wou'd willingly compass it with under the name of a Campaign, so that they cou'd not be willing to part with for good and

all; since they intended to forfeit the Condition and
do themselves, or rather not suffer that to be done
which wou'd give them a right to ask for it again.

This being the Design of France, all these Negotiations
by Letters, came to nothing; and one Side wou'd not
offer what the other cou'd accept, unless the Allies were
to be content with the name of an Expedient, instead of a
Thing; and have taken that for a Security, which they
were before-hand sure, cou'd by no means answer.
End 'twas given for: which the Allies were too wise
to do; and had they done otherwise, which is so foolish a
Supposition, I don't well know how to make it, had
been agree'd to put into the Hands of the Dutch the
Cautionary Towns, over and above those that they
have by the Preliminaries, wou'd it have please'd the
Gentlemen, who are so angry that a Peace is not yet made?
Wou'd they not have been the forwardest to shew
Insufficiency of such an Expedient? Wou'd they not, from
the evident Folly of it, have readily argu'd, it was the Effet
not of Folly but of Treachery? Wou'd it not have been
said, that Spain and the Indies were given up in Com-
plement to the Dutch, that they might have a better Pro-
tector? Wou'd not some body have been censur'd as a
Vourer of the Dutch too, for agreeing to so Scandalous
an Expedient, for an Article of so much importance?
Wou'd not Emmissaries have been employ'd in Holland and
France, to learn if there were not some secret whispering
least, of a private Correspondence carry'd on by a Ger-
man, for facilitating the way to a Peace so much to the
mind both of France and the States? from what is now
doing of this kind, we may be very sure what wou'd
have been done; and the foolish Frenchify'd, Aye to the
Dutch Politicks of some Men, which if they prevail, will in
some time or other, infallibly prove the Ruin of this Na-
tion, leave no room to doubt, but that if Spain must be lost,
they had rather loose it without this Expedient, than
with it, if Holland is to be the better for it. This is evi-
dently, that I shall say no more to vindicate the Allies
this Head, which I shall end with observing, that the
French did not only trifle with the Allies, in offering
suchious Expedients, but sometimes did it in terms pro-
evident

evidently when they saw Monsieur Villars cou'd not be at-
 tended in his strong Camp near Dijon, and were in hopes
 the Allies cou'd do nothing more on that side but take
 their Journey, and had no News from any other Quarter. Now
 in this Interval they affirmed to continue even after the
 defeat of Marly, whith because 'twas short of those they
 before receiv'd, and their Men were so hemm'd in with
 the Rencement, that they cou'd not run away, if they
 cou'd, they woud have it thought a sort of Vi-
 cinity, and a Sign that the French Courage was at last re-
 cover'd by Marly, which Vendome had in vain attempted,
 and search'd from last in purpose for that great Work :
 which had then no other effect on the King's Affairs, but
 to ruin them in one part, without mending them in the
 other. But now it seems the Business is done, and the
 Courage is restor'd; and has the Dutch been as ready
 to believe what the French said of that Battle, as some
 People have been since to credit the Accounts they
 of what pass'd in the late Treaties, they had certainly
 frightened into Peace upon their Terms & any Ex-
 plement or no Expedient it had been all one, they woud
 accept without Difficulty so much of the Prelimi-
 naries, as the Marquis de Turenne woud have left them.
 the Dutch knew better the Ground they stood
 on; they knew the Accounts of their Friends were to
 depend on; but that the Reports of the Enemy de-
 spared no Credit, wherin Allainz put them under the ut-
 ter possibility of misrepresenting the true State of things;
 where they have long practis'd in great Perfection, and
 sometimes with no little Success. This made the States
 to their point, and abt recd. an inch from what
 intituted, which for some time occasiion'd a stop
 in the Negotiations the French not knowing how to pres-
 ent their own Expedient, or to accept theirs, since they were
 oblig'd to propose no good one, and ill ones woud not
 be accept'd; and they found themselves more puzzled by
 the Action of Marly, which was a plain Desertration to
 the World, than the Advantage as well as Honour of
 the Allies was altogether on the side of the Allies. The
 progress of the Campaign, in which the Allies had gain'd
 a great

the Strongest Fortress in Europe, and another not much inferior to it, and had gain'd under the greatest Difficulties one of the most obstinate Battles that were ever fought, gave the French reason to think the Allies wou'd rather rise than fall in their Demands; and as they made them for a while affect to stand off, and the course of Letters with Monsieur Petkum seemed to be at an End: but this Humour, as it was affected, was it not selfe.

After some time, the Marquis de Torey wrote to Monsieur Petkum to desire, since the Point in dispute could not be adjusted by Letters, that Passe might be given for some Ministers from France to come to Holland, to renew the Conferences, or that Monsieur Petkum might be permitted to go to France, to try if his Preliminaries could help to find out an Expedient, that had hitherto been in vain endeavour'd by Letters. The first the States refus'd, till they knew precisely what they were to expect; since under the appearance of some good, the presence of French Ministers in Holland gave them an opportunity to do a great deal of harm, by sowing of Jealousy among the Allies, poisoning the Minds of People against their Governors, and regarding the Preparations for another Campaign, which can never be push'd with the Vigour they shou'd, while People are mus'd with the Specious Appearances of an approaching Certain Peace. For so the French endeavoured to make it every where thought, where they meant nothing. For these Reasons the States refus'd to give Passe for many Ministers to come from France, till they knew more of their Intentions. But to shew their readiness to be open to any reasonable Proposal, they consented Monsieur Petkum shoul'd go to France which he did upon the latter End of November.

But before I give you an Account of that Journey, I will acquaint you, that while their Negotiations, now carrying on by Letters with France, the Duke of Alva did not only take all the proper Measures he cou'd to maintain himself in the Monarchy, which his Grandee he was in appearance, creating to give out, but publishing no

inable Manifesto the beginning of July, wherein he
 avows against all that should be translated at the Hague
 his prejudice, as void and null, and declares his
 resolution to adhere to his faithful Spaniards; as long
 there is a Man of them will stand by him; and it is so
 from quitting Spain and the Indies to his Competi-
 tor that he won't consent he should have those parts of
 the Monarchy which he was then possess'd of; and in
 consequence of this Manifesto, he names the Duke of Alba
 and Count Bergheycck for his Plenipotentiaries, who were
 to notify it to the Maritime Powers, which Count
 Bergheycck did, in a Letter to the Duke of M———
 from Mons, August the 21st, with a Copy of their
 Instructions, and they sent another at the same time to
 the Deputy of the States, which were accordingly trans-
 mitted to their Principals: but no Answer was shou'd
 either by England or Holland to be return'd to them,
 and to admit Plenipotentiaries from him now, wou'd
 do all that had been hitherto agreed on; and instead
 seeking for an Expedient for one Article of the Pre-
 liminaries, the whole of them wou'd have been
 Troy'd, and the T R E A T Y must have been begun
 entirely anew. This wou'd have been the Consequence
 admitting Ministers from the Duke of Anjou; and
 was this we shall see afterwards the French aim'd at.
 I can't leave this Head, without observing to you,
 that in Count Bergheycck's Letter there were broad Inzi-
 nations, how grat'ful the Duke of Anjou wou'd be, if
 mean of his Grace's good Offices, his just and reasona-
 ble Delices might be comply'd with: There was nothing
 wou'd not do to content England in general, or that
 might be to his Grace's Satisfaction in particular. They
 likewise heard from good Hands, that Monsieur Torcy
 very unnecessarily, and with great Officiousness, wro't
 two or three very Civil Letters to his Grace; till he
 found his Civilities were lost upon him. They were
 both mistaken in their Man, if they thought any thing
 wou'd tempt him to go into any secret Measures against
 the Interest of his Country and the Good of the
 Union Cau'e. But these Ministers have both of them had
 no such Experience of the Power of Corruption else-
 where

where, nor to be excusable for trying it here, when
was so much for the Service of their Masters. And the
not succeeding here, has not, I believe, deter'd them
from trying their Skill, where they may succeed better.

If the D. of M. govern'd himself with respect to Peace
by private Views; there is, I think, no doubt, but he
is to be got a great deal, by agreeing to the Terms
of France, than he can ever hope for by refusing them: As
I believe one may safely say, no Ministers was
gratify'd for making a good Peace, tho' many have been
well paid for persuading their Masters into ill ones.

But to return to Monsieur Petkum, and his Journey
to Paris, which the States consented to, not from any ex-
pectation they expected from it, but to prevent the ill Use the
missarys of France wou'd make of their refusing it.
After a stay there of about ten Days, and several fruitfull
Interviews with the Marquiss de Torcy, he return'd
to the Hague, Decemb, 7. without having been able to make
the least Progress in the Busines he went on, or bring-
ing so much as the Pretence of an Expedient along with
him: But instead of that, he brought the Sense of
French Court in a Paper drawn up by Monsieur Ton
which has made so publick, that I can't but presume you
have seen it, and must remember, that the Substance of
it was to this effect: That the Design of the Preliminary
Articles being to prevent, if possible, the Campaign
which was then drawing on; since that Effect cou'd not
be obtain'd, the reason of them was now eas'd, together
with the King's Obligation to agree to them, since they
were not accepted within the Time limited: but that
the Allies wou'd, the King was willing the Winter should
be employ'd in treating definitively of Peace; and that
in suppressing the Form of those Articles, he wou'd present
the Substance of them, and on the Foundation of the Con-
cessions therin made to the Allies, he wou'd consent
to resume the Negotiations, to commence from the first
January following; and that the Execution of the Arti-
cles shou'd, as is usual in all Treatys, begin from the
time of their Ratification. This was the Answer Monsieur
Petkum brought, which was short even of their Expec-

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ns who hop'd for least from it : for this overthrew all
the Preliminaries at once, while the King pretended to
agree to all but one ; and by promising to keep the Sub-
sidence of them, while they destroy the Form, they effectu-
ally defeat all that had been done, and recover to them-
selves an entire liberty to dispute all Points afresh, and
lay hold of all the Occasions which that wou'd give
them to create Divisions and Jealousies between the States
and their Allies, which is plainly the great Point they
have all along aim'd at : which tho' they have been so ter-
ribly disappointed in, they are unwilling to give over,
hopes their Constancy and Firmness to the common
cause wou'd in time be weary'd out, and yield to the
opportune solicitations with which they tempted them-
selves to prevent a new Campaign might be a reason for hys-
ting the Preliminaries, 'twas not the only or chief Reason of
it. Whenever a Treaty shou'd commence, the Allies had de-
cid'd long before, in answer to the Elector of Bavaria's Let-
ter at the end of the Ramillies Campaign, they wou'd not
wager on it, 'till some fundamental Points were first settled,
necessity of which they were convinc'd of by the clear-bright
experience of former Treaties ; and the same Experience has
taught the Allies, that no Treaty with France can be effectual,
till the fundamental Articles are not executed as well as agreed
before the general Treaty is concluded : which Country the
French wou'd entirely take away, by deferring the Execut-
ion of their Ratification. Thus the two great Ends of a Pre-
liminary Treaty, which are to agree on some fundamental Points,
to secure the Execution of them, are by this Answer utterly
spoil'd ; and the Allies are not only where they wou're before
Treaty was begun, but are really the worse for it ; it being
greater Advantage to the French to know before hand what
the particular Demands which the Emperor and Maritime
Confederates insist on for themselves, and in behalf of the rest of
the Allies. As for solving all now by two Words, Form and Sub-
sidence ; two other Words, the Letter and Spirit of the Par-
ticular Treaty, we shall too well remember'd for the Allies to be
deceiv'd by French Distinctions, which if they cou'd
not pass upon them, 'tis easie to see, that the Form of those
Articles wou'd have been found to be the Substance of others
and

and the pretended Sublime would have prov'd a shadowy. Here then Dutch-Banknotes and Plain-dealing prov'd absurd for the fitness of the Faction; & Work was more peculiar than the Thing meant by it. The States, having consider'd the Answer more than it deserve'd, with the Minis^ter of the Affair, who all capably agreed in the same Opinion of it, in a Resolution; they took Dec. 14. which has likewise been made publickly; declare'd it was not satisfactory, and resolv'd to push the War with the utmost Vigour.

About the time that Mons. Petkum return'd, the King of France wrote to the Duke of Anjou, to acquaint him what had pass'd, and assure him, that tho' he wad oblig'd to recall his Troops, he need not be alarm'd at it, for that he would never abandon him; and that he had order'd Twelve of Regiments that were in Spain, to join the Spaniards, in case King Charles should make an Irruption into Aragon. A little after Mons. Ibberville was sent to Madrid; but the particulars of his Journey and Business were made so great & Secret, that was not for some time known whether he was gone; or whether he came to Madrid, where he arrived Dec. 26. his instructions were to communicate his Business to no body but King himself. He did not make a long stay, nor was his appearance well receiv'd; but no judgment cou'd be made from whence what his Errand was; there was no way to distinguish between what was real and what disguise.

But to judge from other Steps, 'tis most reasonable to think his Business was to learn the state the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Lesson, how he shou'd manage the so nice a Furniture, with Assurances, that in spite of all his pretences to the contrary, which the necessity of his Affairs might oblige the King to make, he woud never desert him, unless, if best agree with the Allies upon any terms to turn his Arms against him. But this Journey was made a great Mystery, & engag'd to make the Allies believe, the Business of it was to persuade the Duke of Anjou to retire out of Spain, since it wou'd be almost impossible for the King to support him any longer. If this Knowledge were not a perfect Master in all the Arts and Methods of the European War, as great an Enemy as he is, I shou'd be almost tempted to perswade him, to set how hard a Game he has to play. He has interest with two Parties, one of which must be support'd on

whether the Spaniards be well assist and support his Grandson, what it will; and at the same time he promises most faithfully the Allies, that he will not give the least Assistance to either directly or indirectly. Now if he can find Credit with both parties, either he is a very cunning Man, or one of them are y greas Fools. In the present Case I shou'd suspect the last. The Allies cou'd be thus imposed on: for if we consider who ob both by Nature and Interest, he is most inclin'd to, or w his Actions to be a better proof of his Meaning than his words, there is no room to doubt but the Allies are the Party he w'd deceive if he cou'd; since 'tis evident from what I have alreadie said in the beginning of this Letter, he has ever sinc Conferences at the Hague broke off, been doing all he cou'd the Service of his Grandson, that he may be able to support himself without any visible Assistance from France. All Affairs are so far retriev'd, as not to make any Management in doing it longer necessary. But all the Inference I wou'd at present make from this is, that, since the Spaniards shou'd be deceiv'd, if we are not, or we must, if they are not. Words or Promises, be they ever so fair, shou'd weigh nothing or be thought any Argument of his Stability, unless his Actions go along with them.

But to return to the Negotiations, after the Paper brought about P. Perhaps, no new advances were made till the beginning of February, when an Express brought him a fresh Project of Peace to be communicated to the Allies, which differ'd little from the other, or rather was an approbation of it. Twas the main the same with the Preliminaries, but cast into a plainer form, which was effectually destroyed the Preliminaries, as it had been put into no form at all: besides several Alterations, for the Restoration of the Spanish Monarchy there is a Article only; the Clause of the old Article, whereby the King gives up all his Dominions with the Allies, proper measures, to preserve his Grandson &c so, is left out; the restoring of the Two Elector Palatines, is insisted on as a Preliminary, and of the Elector of his Kingdom in particular to the Upper Palatinate, in contradiction of the Preliminaries, by which this agreed to should remain to impinge the Elector Palatine, whom the Emperor had some time before he had into Possession of it, than which nothing cou'd be more reasonable; no Prince having suffered so much from France as one

of them, or deserved so ill of the Emperor as the other. As
 the 37th Article, the Expedient offered, was three Towns in
 Flanders of his own choosing : an Offer, which by what I
 already said, you will see, is worth nothing, since he woulde
 never give any Towns that the Allies could think a tolerable
 injury for so important a Point ; besides that, if the Towns
 agreed on, many Difficulties would certainly rise in the Execu-
 tion, and in settling the Terms on which they shoud remit
 him or not ; for if the Allies were to keep him only till the
 Affairs of Spain were decided, what woulde they have been
 better for them, if in the issue of things it should not end to
 mind ? which he woulde take the best care he could to do, so
 I mention this, because I have seen the Condition of the
 Diet so worded, or to that effect ; and this not very
 take away all room for Equivocations, and an Ambiguity
 give, which the Prince we are treating with, knowes how to
 erect into a clear indisputable Right. But to complete the
 object, and that the Design and End of the Preliminaries
 be entirely subverted, his proposals that the Execution of all
 Articles be defer'd till the Treaty be concluded, and the wa-
 terifications exchang'd. This is the noble Project that was
 to the Hague the beginning of February, and was the result of
 many Councils that had been held in the preceding Month, to
 satisfy the Kings good Subjects of his sincere Desires after Peace
 and as if this had been an Act of great Grace, the King
 this be not accepted, declares himself free from all Engagements
 but this being in effect the same with the Paper Mons. Peaces
 brought, and nothing but the old Baile made up a new, the
 parties were too wise to bite at it but as France had all along
 excepted to nothing but the 37th Article, they were resolute
 adhere to the rest, and therefore woud admit of no Compro-
 mises till they explainid themselves fully as to that Point. When
 the French saw so much stiffness on the Part of the Allies,
 who are not so religious Observers of their Word, as to suffer
 little scrupling Compliance to do them any harm, or to lose
 point for want of it, thought fit to recede in appearance at least
 and gave the States all the assurance the most express could
 woud do, that the King agreed to all the other Preliminaries
 and that if they would confess his Ministers shoud come to P-
 ariser with them upon the 37th Article, he did not doubt to
 what ground he propos'd from him, woud be to their Satisfaction

This was so full a Declaration, as gave some hopes, that Difficulty might be adjusted, or at least it wou'd have made the refusal of what they ask'd look inviolous; The States were therefore, so remove all pretence of Complaint, as if they were still dissident, or had a mind to prolong the War, which they now in the French were always labouring to interrupt; a Resolution, in which their Friends bore copy after them perfectly well acquainted them Passports for such Mischief, as the King shou'd think fit to send: The Express arrived the 20th, and was sent before the 23d. I mention these Dates, (which as all the rest, are of the new Stile) to shew, how little difficulty the States had, tho' at the very time the King gave them these assurances, that all the Preliminaries shou'd remain, in full force, notwithstanding such Alterations in the Terms of the Execution as the change of time had made necessary, they knew he had just done, but it wou'd make other Alterations necessary, and wou'd oblige the King to change the Stile at least of the Preliminaries in several articles, and that in a very material point, the thing I mean of this, giving to the second Son of the Duke of Burgundy, who was born the 15th, the Title of Duke of Anjou, which was a vindication, he resolved to insist upon his Grandsons having the title of King Philip, given him in the next Conferences: notwithstanding, tho' in appearance a little matter, wou'd draw after it other possible Consequences; for, if he is to retain the Title of King, it wou'd be imagined he can ever return to France with that agement, after, that wou'd upon so many accounts be so inconvenient. Perhaps had his return thereto been intended, we may be sure, the former Title wou'd have been retain'd. If therefore, the同盟e of King wou'd remain to him, it was intended a King-estate should do too; and from thence one of these two things must follow a, either that the King of France would make one, or a Separate peace for himself, and leave the Allies to get their own, as they cou'd; or if he agree'd to a general one, it shou'd so justify the Root of a partition. But these Inferences, as natural as they were, did not bind the States to grant the peace as he desired, and to do every thing they could to facilitate the progress of a good Peace.

Ulinius bears Account, of verbal part from Monk, Peikum's Fourtcome to Paris to this time, that is from the latter end of November to the beginning of March, leaves but little room to except, he came from the same Conference, the Affairs having in this

this interval not at all advanc'd, but rather gone backward. For before that Journey, the constant League was, to look out for an Expedient for the 37th Article, and that all the others were allow'd. But from that Journey that Language began to change; some things were to be left out, others put in; the Form, which is the Life of 'em, as Articles, is taken away, and the whole new modell'd, and the Security is destroy'd, while the Execution, agreed on, is defer'd. This is all this interval produced, till just the end of it, when the old Language is again resum'd, and the only Point to be adjust'd, is appearance, the 37th Article.

As this Management of France gave the States no good Opinion of their being sincere, they push'd the preparations of the Campaign with all the Vigour possible, and erected prodigious Magazines on the Frontier, that the Army might be able to take the Field early, and win in very pressing Terms to the Queen, that she wou'd please to send over the Duke of M—— if he cou'd be spared so soon, before the end of February, that they might have the Benefit of his Wise Counsels, as well as reap the Advantage of his incomparable Valour: This is the Language in which the States, who have had so much Experience of him, always speak of this great man; a sufficient Reason with some to undervalue him, who know nothing themselves, but are taught to think whatever the Duke do must be wrong. But to go on, as the suspicions of French gave of their insincerity, made the States pursue most effectual Measures for an early Campaign; so it lay upon them taking the best care they cou'd, that if good shou'd come from the Renewing of the Conference, they might prevent the Mischief they apprehended was signed by them. And therefore, tho' they gave leave to the Conferences to be renew'd, they wou'd not suffer the Ministers of France to come into the Heart of the Country, till the point in dispute shou'd be agree'd. So the French pretended to except to nothing but the 37th Article, and said, they had an Expedient for that which they doubted not, wou'd give content; this being an easy affair, which, in all appearance, required but little time, and seem'd not to require many Conferences: the States propos'd, upon M—— being call'd, to lend their Deputy or o-

confer with the Ministers of France, either at *Moers* or *Gerruydenberg*. The French lik'd neither of these places, but when no other could be obtain'd, they chose last; where they arrived the 10th of March, but were the day before by the Deputies of the States at *Moers*, where was held the first Conference: which suffi-
ciently shew'd, what slender hopes there were of any good from them.

The Ministers of France were the Marquis d'Ussel, the Abbé de Potigny, Men extremely well qualify'd for the Business they came upon: And the Deputies on the part of the States, were Messieurs *Buys* and *Vanderduysen*; same by whom the first Conferences with Monsieur de *Wille* were manag'd the Year before; and who are known, which I shou'd have mention'd in my last, to have no aversion to a Peace, if it cou'd be had on reasonable terms. These Conferences, which were begun on March 9th, continu'd till July; on the 25th of which Month, the French Ministers left *Gerruydenberg*. So that these Conferences lasted more Weeks than they shou'd have suffered to do Days; there being but one suggestion, by their own Confession, in Dispute; which is the only Fault that I believe any body can find in that the States had in the Management of this Affairs; they were as sensible themselves of it, as any body cou'd be. They knew the Advantage the French made of the stay of the Plenipotentiaries in *Holland*; which tributed extremely to keep up the spirits of the People in France, and make them bear patiently the continuall of the War, and the arbitrary and violent Methods made use of to support it. *Bread and Peace* was the cry of common People all over France, and the Court was continually afraid of great tumults in the great Towns, in the remoter Provinces; which made it necessary to meet them with the most specious Appearances of Peace, which they all along gave out, was as good as made; and by many Express that arriv'd, the People were made to hope, and shou'd bring the welcome News, that the Articles were prov'd. Nor were the French content to impose this on their own People, their Emissaries did the same thing in *Holland*.

Netherlands; and 'twas by their means often very confidently reported, that all was agreed, when the States had no Interest in deceiving their People, gave themselves no occasion for their entertaining such false Hopes. In this the French did, to make them insensibly grow weary of the War, and shew themselves out of Humour with their Governors; and that they might have the Odissey & ceiving them, while themselves made their Uses of One of which was, to enable them to find Credit easily at Amsterdam; where underhand, 'tis certain, great Sums of Money were negotiated, and sent in Specie to Brussels; which an appearance of Peace very much facilitated, by the Hopes it gave of good Payment; and in mean time, there was the Temptation of great Interest, and besides all the other Purposes, these reports of Peace serv'd to, they hop'd it might make the States themselves forward to supply the great Expence which a vigorous Siege calls for, and utterly averse to a Battle, which the French were most afraid of; and whenever the Conference should end, the greater the Expectations had been of Peace, the more People wou'd be dissatisfy'd at its going off; and the Fault would seem to be at least theirs, who had been loudest, and talk'd most for it. These Advantages the French in fact did make of the stay of the Plenipotentiaries at Gœtruydenberg; and it was before hand easy to see they wou'd: but the Remedy was so easy. And therefore, tho' the States were sensible from the first Conference, that the wisest part they could take, was to send them back immediately, or limit the stay to a very short time; they did not only manage their Conference by Deputies, who, as I have said, wou'd no inclination to Peace, but suffer'd the French to stay till there was not the least Pretence for more Conferences, or the French at least wou'd make none, but we ourselves willing to be gone. This the States thought themselves oblig'd to do, to prevent the Insinuations of the French, which were industriously spread by their Massaries, as if the old Ministry, the Pensionary, and Friends were overfond to Peace, and had a Design to perpetuate the War for their own Interest. This is

Calum

lumny has so much Influence over the Minds of the
People in other Governments, to think, that great Care
ought not to be taken to obviate the Dose and Mischiefs
in one that is wholly Popular. This was the Rea-
son that determin'd the Dutch Ministry to let the Plenipo-
tentaries make so long a stay; for they too have their
Enemies, tho' not hitherto successful ones.

But to come to the Conferences themselves: The first
was on March the 9th, at Moerdyke; in which, to shew
what might be expected from the rest, the Ministers of
France, after all Assurances that had been given of the
King's agreeing to those Articles which give up the
whole Spanish Monarchy in the most ample manner, be-
gan with proposing a Partition; and that Naples and Sicily
with Sardinia, and the Towns upon the Coast of Tus-
sibly belonging to Spain, shou'd be granted to one of the
competitors, without naming which: That since the Dutch
wou'd not be satisfy'd with cautionary Towns in Flan-
Con no other Expedient was left but this; it being ve-
ry hard to oblige the King to force his Grandson to quit,
impossible to persuade him to it, without a valuable
consideration. The nothing cou'd be more exactly against
Advantages than this Proposal of a Partition, the
French did not wholly reject it, nor did the other side ab-
solutely insist upon all they at first ask'd, which if they
little had remain'd for them but to go back, it being
possible to think the Emperor wou'd ever consent to
it with Naples, which wou'd give the French such
ing in Italy, as wou'd soon make them Masters of the
whole, and endanger his Hereditary Country. The Mi-
nisters of France were made so sensible of this, as to give
the Point, and say, They believ'd the King wou'd
the sake of Peace, be prevail'd with to desist from
part of his Demands, towards which they promised
good Offices: and so the first Conference ended.
Deputies returned to the Hague, and the Plenipoten-
taries sent an Express to the King, to let him know
it had past. Upon the return of the Express, the
Plenipotentiaries sent to the Hague, to desire another
ference; which was agreed to, and the 20th the
Deputies went a second time to confer with them: their
part

part in these Interviews having been concert'd in
mean time with the Ministers of the Emperor and Eng-
land at several Meetings for that purpose, and the
of the Allies having been at a general Meeting inform'd
of what had been mov'd in the first Conference. A
this was the Constant way, in which these Negotia-
tions were carry'd on while the Ministers of France
tiu'd at Germuydenberg. At the end of a Conference
they sent an Express to Court ; and upon his Return
perhaps the next day, perhaps two or three days after
when they had decyph'r'd their Instructions, and sett
matters between themselves, they notify'd it at the Hague
and desir'd another Conference ; which was agreed.
The Deputies went, confer'd, return'd, reported ; up
which the Allies meet, consult, agree, and settle w/
further Steps shou'd be made on their part.

The French on their side send an Express again to Court
and so on. In this manner the Deputies went to a
Conference the 6th of April, and to a fourth the 23d. The
main Point debated in these Conferences, was this Par-
tition. And that no Obstruction to a General Peace on
foot on the part of England might arise from the Addi-
tion of the two Houies mention'd in my last, care was ta-
ken by the D. of M. and the late M —— that the Parlia-
ment shou'd not be prorogu'd in the Spring as usually ; but
the Session shou'd be continu'd by short Adjournments
till all hopes of Peace were at an End, that the Queen
might have their Concurrence to agree to such a Par-
tition, as they shou'd think reasonable. The King of Eng-
land was willing at last to recede from Naples being part of
but insisted on the rest, and wou'd by no means con-
sent to quit the Towns on the Coast of Tuscany, which
Grandison had still possession of. And as he was un-
willing to give up these, so the Deputies cou'd not con-
sent to part with Sardinia, which was already in the Em-
peror's possession. So that on the part of the Allies,
Deputies were unwilling to part with any thing of
Partition propos'd but Sicily, and the French would
have nothing but Naples. The Allies were willing to
consent to something for a General Peace, and 'twas thought Eng-

they were sincere, woud be willing to take any thing. And this the Allies had the more reason to expect, from
tum the Campaign was like to take: The D^r of M.
Prince Eugene, who left the Hague the 14th, having
d^d the Scarpe without opposition the 20th, at which
States had the welcome News time enough for the De-
ties to carry it with them to the Fourth Conference.
this Success, which put France into a great Confer-
on, had in appearance no effect on them. They pre-
sed they had no power to recede from their last De-
ds, but would send to Court for further Instructions;
which they were allow'd till the 18th of May. But
had no occasion, it seems, for so much time: Then
ess came back the 3d, which was notify'd the 7th ;
the King still insisting, 'twas to no purpose to have
e Conferences, which was signify'd to them by M.
Colum.

pon which they pretended to be very stiff, and declar'd
would leave Germany before the 15th or 16th; and
Jeff was carry'd so far, that part of their Ratione and
nippage was actually sent away. But this was all a feint:
en the 15th came, an Express arriv'd very propos to
s Appearances, and enable them to stay with a good
ee: which they notify'd the 18th, and the Deputies
it to them the 22d. And in this Conference the King
pleas'd to desist from the Towns on the Coast of
the Quay, but adher'd to his Demand of Sicily and Sardinia.
And to remove the Objection against this last, a pro-
had been sometimes forming to make a Defeat on it,
get into Possession; which design, when it was in a
m^r ex euted, was happily defeated by a part of the
ces that were then going from Italy to Catalonia.
His point of the Partition being driven as far as it
d go, 'twas now the Turn of the Allies to ask, sup-
ing this Partition agreed to, that th Servants of the Span-
llies, shoul^d be given to the Duke of Aix,
ch way the King propos'd they shoul^d have the m
r'd to them: For the Reason the Allies insisted on the
Article, was, that they might have a General Peace,
not be involved in a Separat War with Spain. This
was

was the Business of these Conferences, and there was
 Sense in the French pretending to demand a Partition
 upon any other Terms, but supposing the Allies would
 quit the one part of the Monarchy to the D. of Anjou,
 that he shou'd quit the rest to them. 'twas to be per-
 sum'd, the King knew his Grandson's Mind upon
 Head, and that he had either Authority from him
 to eat of a Partition, or that he had himself the Power
 his Hands to oblige him to consent to it. But these
 Plenipotentiaries could not speak fully to at this Con-
 ference; 'twas left to be the subject of the next, which
 not held till June 16. For tho' that Express arriv'd
 6 h. it was not notify'd till the 10th. By this time
 French Court were pretty well out of pain for Arta, the
 Army having been some time assembled, and in such good
 as would make it impracticable for the Allies to come
 together at them or the Town: and this probably had
 little share in regulating the Motions of the French Com-
 flets, and the Instructions they sent to their Ministers
 with whom the Deputies had on the 16th Confer-
 from morning to night, upon this Capital Point, how
 Allies should be put into possession of Spain and the Indies.
 To which the Answer was, That the King was willing
 to concert the proper measures with them, according
 the fourth Article. But this the Deputies could not be
 sufficient: For this he was oblig'd to by the Pleni-
 potentiaries, tho' the 37th had been struck out; besides
 it was inconsistent with a general Peace, which they
 all along insisted on, and would necessarily engage
 in a Spanish War, which they had been treating of
 tition to prevent. But to understand their meaning
 distinctly, they desir'd them to explain themselves, what
 those Measures were, the King would come into: whether
 he joyn his Forces to theirs, to oblige his Grandson
 accept the Terms he should make for him? Why
 perhaps he woud. But in the discussing this point,
 took care to start a thousand difficulties, to shew it
 impracticable; such as these how to settle what shou'd
 the whole Force employ'd to reduce Spain and the Indies
 what share each shou'd contribute; how they shou'd
 jointly or separately; who shou'd Command; how

want, and by whom their Instructions for acting should
 be given'd, and the like ; and the same difficulties might
 be expected for the Sea Service. Well, if these measures
 be impracticable, as no doubt they are where one Party
 designs to come heartily into them ; what are those
 King will come into ? Why, he will contribute a
 Sum of Money towards the Expence the Allies
 be at upon this occasion. How now will this mend
 this matter ? How shall they be able to settle the Sum,
 to secure the payment ? The first of these is a very dif-
 Point, when it comes to be drawn out into particu-
 lar, and to be consider'd how hard it is to know the
 time of such a War, how long it may continue ?
 and where and at what time the Payments shall be
 made, and if a Sum certain can't be fix'd at first, who
 settle the Proportion France shall pay, or oblige them
 quiete in it ?

if those difficulties cou'd be overcome, what security can
 the Allies have for payment ? A very pretty one indeed, is that
 the French offer'd, that the richest Bankers of Paris
 be bound for it. One woud be glad to know, what re-
 the Allies cou'd have against their Bankers in case of
 war, or how they can reach them. To take Paris it self,
 not seem to me more difficult. But they are men of Hc,
 and may be trusted. 'Tis true, and so they have been,
 King's Affairs have made the greatest of them Bank-
 rids. But if they were men of ever so much Honour, or were
 so much concerned to support their personal Credit, in
 their own private Affairs, what is Honour or Credit against
 of a Prince ? where an Arbitrary Prince is pleased to in-
 : which the King has, this Summer particularly, shewn
 us how to do ; having for every great Sums taken the
 of his Bankers on himself, and declar'd them b'g, and by
 means has rendord all legal Remedies impossible. Before
 their Credit was better than the King's, but by being
 for him, it is sunk as low as b'g, and in effect become
 w it is b'g, that is, no Credit at all. And is not this a rare
 shon for the Allies to trust, for the Payment of such Sums
 the b'g be support'd to be the King's Share in the Charge of so
 few a War ? And if Security cou'd be given for a Sum
 how, what is this, but in effect to sell a part of the Spanish
 Monarchy.

Monarchy, for a Sum of Money, towards carrying on a War, which he will take care to render ineffectual.

Upon the Report which the Deputies made the 18th, what had pass'd in this Conference: The Allies had in their meetings to consider what shou'd be done next step. They say from the Account the Deputies had given, that it was the purpose to think of concerting Measures with France for war with Spain after a Peace made with them: What they said about both Troops and Money, evidently shew'd, that of that kind cou'd be thought of, which France wou'd be able to defeat, by the Difficulties with which they wou'd care to puzzl'e it; that all Proposals of this nature were only inconsistent with the End for which these Conferences resum'd, which was to find an Expedition for the 3rd Cle, and obtain the thing design'd by the Preliminaries, which was a General Peace; but also contrary to what had been the beginning of them been suppos'd, upon the French making a Partition: which cou'd mean nothing else, but that they were willing the Spanish Monarchy shou'd effectually be up to the Allies, some part being taken out for the benefit of the Duke of Anjou: That if there were in earnest no Force to compel the Duke of Anjou to it, which was not at all probable, it ought to lie wholly on the King, since he from the beginning promised the Restoration of Spain and Indies, and had laid it down as the Foundation on which they were to treat; which left no room to doubt but the King knew he cou'd by persuasion or Constraint oblige his Grandson to consent to it, since otherwise such a Promise have no other meaning in it, but from the beginning to impose on the Allies.

But however, if Force were necessary, they were agreed in sending the Troops they had in Portugal and Catalonia, shou'd act in concert with the King's to obtain this within the two months, or such other time as should be agreed on. And whoever considers the Duke of Anjou has dependance on France, will easily be satisfy'd, that the King were sincere, and in earnest meant what his Ministers had all along promis'd in his Name, a small force, and a very little time wou'd be more than enough.

Upon these Considerations the Allies resolv'd to overrule the Offer of Money they had made, because it supposed

aff particular Peace with France, and the Continuation of the War with Spain, which they could not consent to, for reasons given in the first Conference ; and to demand them to Explain themselves upon the Subject of the Vacuation of Spain and the Indies in favour of King Charles, agreeably to the Preliminaries, before the Allies you'd declare their Intentions with respect to the Partition ; and that unless they did this, all further Conferences you'd be to no purpose.

This Resolution the Allies signify'd to the Ministers of France, in a Letter to them from Mr. Peckum, July, 8. which they declin'd giving a distinct Answer, but de-
d' another Conference ; which was accordingly held
ich them the 13th : in which the Deputies having ex-
ain'd fully the Sense of the Allies, and the Resolution
nt them by Mr. Peckum, (not that it wanted any Ex-
anation, tho the Plenipotentiaries had thought fit to say
to avoid giving a distinct Answer to it) they insisted
a like clear and full Explication on the part of France :
id this being a home pull, that left no room for Evasion.
hen they saw themselves thus pres'd, they resolv'd to
ut the best Face they cou'd upon the Matter, and were
as'd to call this peremptory Summons to explain them-
ives a formal Rupture of the Treay ; and that therefore
hing was left for them to do but to return home. The
Deputies gave them time to send once more to Court, in
hich they desir'd there might be no delays, and so par-
d. The Express they sent to Versailles did not stay a-
ove two or three Hours, as if he had gone merely for
weal sake, and was back again at Gertruydenberg the
Cath 5th, which they notify'd the 11th with a long Letter to
the Pensionary, in form of a Manifesto, and went them-
selves away the 25th. This Letter I take for granted
of All you have seen, it has been so often printed ; and therefore
hat need not tell you in has in it all the Art of a French
his Writer, and of an Able Minister ; and that it is as well
all done, at the Cause they are to defend, will admit : but
ough you have read this Letter, I cannot but suppose you
to have also read the Resolution of the States, July 27. its
lappy answer to it, which is writ with that Plainness and Sim-
gerity,

cerity, it is so free from Disguise and Artifice, there is in it such solid Reasoning, so much good Sense, such a force of Truth, that a Man must be a very ill Judge, or have no very honest Mind, that can't see, or will not own, that the Integrity and Honour of the Allies is abundantly justify'd and clear'd from the false Aspersions which the French Letter wou'd throw upon them ; and that the ill Success of these Negotiations is intirely owing to those, who wou'd cast the blame of the Rupture upon them ; it being exceeding plain, that the King of France has put it out of the Power of the Allies to make a general Peace, by refusing to give them Spain and the Indies, without which a good Peace can never be made, or the End for which we went into the War tolerably answer'd : and the more this Affair is examin'd into, the more you will be convinc'd of the Insincerity of the French, and the Necessity the Allies were under, to act as they did.

First, 'Tis indisputably true and confess'd on all hands, that the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, whatever became of the rest of the Monarchy, was promis'd from the very first ; they did not pretend to desire so much as one single Conference for Peace on any other terms.

Now, if the King cou'd do what he promis'd, what becomes of the pretended Impossibility ? And if he cou'd not, what cou'd he mean by such a Promise but to amuse and deceive ? But if he design'd that, then it undeniably follows, all these Negotiations on his part have been one continued Cheat from the Beginning to the End. And that this is the Truth of the Case, I have given you many Proofs both in my last Letter, and in this. All the Expedients he propos'd, were so many Shams, and had no other meaning in them but to gain Time, quiet his People, and sow Jealousies among the Allies ; and defend if possible by a Treaty those he can't defeat by his Arms. What else cou'd he mean by proposing a Partition as an Expedient, and yet refusing to let it have the Effect of one ? To ask the States to consent to a Partition, and not suffer them to ask for what, is a little too barefac'd. Cou'd they think the Dutch wou'd consent to this Expedient for the sake of a General Peace, without being sure, a general

if Peace wou'd be purchas'd by it ? I scarce believe, they
 expected that of them ; but nevertheless hop'd, they shou'd
 in their Ends by it ; and that the very hearkning to the
 proposal of a Partition wou'd create Jealousies and divide
 the Allies, in which they did not judge very ill : for the
 conferences upon this foot very much alarm'd the Minis-
 ters of the Emperor and King *Charles*, who were utterly
 averse to a Partition of any kind ; and it was with great
 difficulty they were prevail'd with to consent to let the
 conferences with the Ministers of *France* be manag'd by
 the Deputies of the States, without their being themselves
 present at them ; which wou'd have rendered the Negotia-
 tions for a general Peace much more difficult than they
 were, tho' *France* had been in earnest for it. And this
 was all *France* aim'd at by proposing a Partition ; some of
 the Allies, they knew, wou'd be extremely against it,
 while the States, they hop'd, wou'd, for so desirous an
 end, be willing enough to come into it ; and this Differ-
 ence they promis'd themselv's much from : but for fear
 this Difficulty shou'd be overcome, and the Allies shou'd
 take them at their words, and accept some of the Expe-
 nes offer'd, they had another Resort be ind, by which
 they cou'd at any time confound all that had been done,
 and had great Hopes, at the same time, that the Alliance
 might be broke by it. And that was this ; they pretended
 they cou'd not execute any part of the Preliminaries, un-
 less the Allies w. u'd oblige themselves not to make any
 other Demands, than what were already contain'd in
 those Articles, or that they shou'd be now declar'd :
 which is contrary to the 23rd Article, in which there is a
 power expressly reserv'd for the Empire, the four Affili-
 ated Circles, the Kings of *Portugal* and *Prussia*, and the
 Duke of *Savoy*, to make what further Demands they
 shall find reasonable. This the French insist'd on, for no
 other reason but because they knew 'twas impossible for
 one of the Allies in justice to comply with it, unless the respec-
 tive Powers above-nam'd had had Ministers at the *Hague*
 with full Instructions from each of them; which they knew
 they neither had, nor cou'd have without losing a great
 deal of time. Besides, this Demand of the French is con-
 trary

treaty not only to the express Terms of the Preliminary but to the very Nature of them; for if nothing is to be left to be adjusted at a general Treaty, how does a Preliminary Treaty differ from it? But it was very much for the Purpose of the French, who meant nothing but to annoy the Allies and make mischief, to insist on it; which accordingly they did, being sure which ever part the Allies took, they shou'd find their Account in it. For if the Allies woud not agree to this Demand, then there was always a Handle ready to break off the Treaty upon; long as further Demands may be made upon them, they can't be sure, any Concessions will procure a lasting Peace; and they shall be in danger of having the War renewed upon them, after all they shall have done to put an End to it. And this is very plausible and specious; but it shall shew you by and by, has at the bottom nothing all in it. But if the Allies had comply'd with this Demand, and declar'd no further Demands shou'd be insisted on, what a fine Game woud the French have had. They had nothing else to do, to break the Alliance, than to represent to some of these Members of it, how the Interests were neglected, and what poor Terms the Maritime Powers and the Emperor have made for them.

You see, Gentlemen, the utmost your Allies ask for you; you see the whole you are to expect from them; these are the Terms they have made for you, and they have promis'd to oblige about to acquiesce in them: Are these Allies worth adhering to? Come over to the Interest of the King, and support his Pretensions, and you will find both him and his Grandchildren more grateful; you shall have this and that and i' other thing, this Town, that Principality, so much Money, such a valuable March, in short, Terms infinitely more advantageous to your Masters, and the Interest of their Families, than what the Allies will do for you. This Artifice the French for the good Effects of the last War, and their Fingers itch to begin again at it; for this was the way they drew off a certain Friend, which was the ruin of that Confederacy; after which Emissaries had been for some time in Holland proposing a general Terms of Peace, and endeavouring to find, what would the Principal Allies woud be content with for the re

then they had learnt this, the Use they made of it, was to
 induce one of them, by offering much better Terms than had
 been ask'd for him; the Baile took, and 'twas agreed to leave
 Side he thought himself ill us'd by; nothing remain'd but
 contrive how this might be done most decently: the way a-
 greed on was to invade his Country with a great Army, and
 Siege to his Capital. What cou'd the unhappy Prince do
 in these Circumstances? he is in the utmost Danger, his Allies
 either do nor can support him; there is no Safety for him but in a
 Victory; and the same Play they want to be again at. This is
 certain, that we are sure they were trying this very trick
 w^t the same Prince. While the Marquis de Torcy made at
 Hague such mighty Difficulties in complying with the Terms
 demanded for the Duke of Savoy, when he pretended his Ma-
 jesty had great Reason to be dissatisfy'd with; this false perfidi-
 Court was at that very time tempting him with better Of-
 fers at Turin; but that Prince understood his Interests too
 well to hearken again to them.

This is the Use the Ministers of France hop'd to make of this
 demand of theirs, if the Allies had been weak enough to
 have agreed to it; but they were not to be so impos'd on, nor
 w^t they act in so arbitrary a manner, as to force any of
 their Allies to submit to Terms made against their Consent, or
 to oblige them without their knowledge; and therefore cou'd not, by all the Ar-
 rangements of France, be prevail'd with to preclude them from making
 further Demands as they shou'd think reasonable. But to
 w^t they were sincere, they were willing to desist from all fur-
 ther Demands for themselves, according to the 31st Article; this
 they cou'd do, more in justice they cou'd no^t. And had the French
 in earnest on their part, they wou'd without difficulty, have
 settled the Allies in this Point; for they cou'd not with any
 of Reason believe, that when the Maritime Powers and
 Emperor were satisfy'd, they wou'd renew the War at the
 of two Months, or what other time shou'd have been agreed
 for the sake of any further Demands on the part of the other
 lies, which it wou'd not be very reasonable for France to
 ans them. And therefore it can't be thought they meant any
 else by urging this Point, but to make mischief, and draw
 Allies if they cou'd into a Snare; and if that did not suc-
 E
 ceed,

eed, that they might always have it in their Power to off.

To reduce the whole Managements of the French in this under one short View; they press the Allies to an Impossibility contrary to the Preliminaries, and complain at the same of being press'd to an impossibility themselves, who the Allies nothing but what they themselves offer'd from the beginning and the Steps they have taken in this Point are very extraordinary. First, Negotiations are broke off upon the Single Article of the 37th Article; then an Expedient is offer'd of Cautionary Towns; then the Conferences are again defer'd to be renew'd upon repeated Assurances of agreeing to all the other Preliminaries except the 37th; then, as what wou'd solve all Difficulties, a Partition is propos'd, which is at last reduc'd to Sicily and Sardinia. And what is all this for? Will they sign Preliminaries, if this Partition be agreed to? by no means; they take the very asking of this Question for a plain Design to break off the Conferences; and they who will have given you before all the Preliminaries except the 37th Article and three cautionary Towns, now take it very ill, you acc't the Preliminaries, not only without that Article, without any Cautionary Towns or other Expedient who Sardinia and Sicily be taken out of them, without having for any more Security given than before, that Spain and the Indies shall be restor'd who propos'd a Partition cou'd not possibly have any other meaning in it: for it was propos'd as an Expedient, but for what? To leave the Allies where it found them no sure; but to remove the pretended Difficulty of evacuating Spain and the Indies, in favour of King Charles.

But if this be the plain meaning of this Proposal, how came the Treaty to break off upon this Point? What can be more unjust, than to desire the Allies to quit part of what the Preliminaries give them for the sake of others, and yet not tell them, which way the rest is to be had? What more ridiculous than to press the States to all these inconveniences, which the consenting to a Partition might be attended with, without allowing them the least Advantage from it? How can one reconcile the asking a Partition at the beginning of the Conferences, and then breaking them off, because the Allies desire to be secured of the effect propos'd from it?

Now after all that has been said upon this Subject, can there be any doubt which Side is in fault, or at whose end it lies that these Confidences did not succeed? One wou'd think, without entering into the Merits of the Cause, shou'd in this case believe our Friends rather than Enemies; and not be in the least at a loss, to know where to lay the Fault, that these Negotiations were broke off, especially considering the part the Allies acted, in what they all readily concur'd in. Such Friends in such a Case, and when so unanimous, ought surely to be credit'd, by those at least who are not themselves competent Judges of the Matter; and even they that are, ought to be very sure of the Goodness of their Reasons before they presume to dissent from them, much more before they censure them: and if we all think our selves so wise, as we will be using our own Judgments, yet sure more credit will be allow'd to such, so many and so faithful Friends, who are embark'd with us in the same Interest, than to Enemies, the worst of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven: for the French Court is and has been time out of mind, that even in a disputable Case, which this is far from being, 'twou'd be absurd to credit them before our Friends, especially in an Affair, wheresoever is of the utmost Importance to them to deceive; and therefore all the Words they use, be they ever so solemn, ought not upon their credit to have any weight with us. The grand Project of a Universal Monarchy is now upon the point of being finish'd or destroy'd; 'tis now at its crisis; one or other must in a little time be the Fate of it: and can one think they will stick at saying any thing, true or false, to prevent the ruin of it? No; what they will or will not do to secure their Project, now they have brought it to such a Point, you can't better judge than by seeing what they cou'd bring themselves to do for the sake of it in its Infancy; when it was but just thought of, and then hardly seem'd practicable. There is, in the last Memoirs of the Treasy of Munster lately publish'd, so remarkable an Instance of this, as shou'd deter a Man as long as he remembers it from giving credit easily to any Asseverations.

Assverations whatsoever of a French Minister, when
for the Interest of his great Master, to which all
Faith and Sincerity must bend. There must be no squa-
mish kind of Honour; no Integrity must be inflexibl-
'tis the King, he must be obey'd, and nothing must
boggled at that is for his Service. The Case was this.
The Union o' France and Spain was a Project Cardin-
Mezarin was extremely fond of; and to facilitate th-
he hop'd at the Treaty of Munster to get from Sp-
the Low Countries, which he propos'd to do two way-
First, To have them in Exchange for Catalonia; wh-
the French had taken from the Spaniards in the War
were then endeavouring to put an end to. Secondly,
way of Dowry upon a Marriage of the Infanta with
King. This Design the Cardinal was so full of, that
meets with it in almost all his Instructions and Lett-
to the French Plenipotentiaries from one end of the M-
moirs to the other; and he had endeavour'd to draw the
Prince of Orange into it, upon a Promise of the Marqu-
of Antwerp. This Matter somehow or other took Air,
alarm'd the States extremely, who were then in League
with France. Their Plenipotentiaries at Munster com-
plain'd of it to the Ministers of France, who protest
nothing of that kind had ever been propos'd to them
the Spaniards. But this did not satisfy the States; a
Year alter, 1647. one of their Ambassadors, Mons. Se-
vien, went to Holland, and to allay the Jealousies
Fears this Affair had given the States, he protests there
nothing in it, in a manner the most solemn that can
imagin'd: he writes a Letter in April, about six Weeks
alter the Prince of Orange was dead, to each of the Pro-
vinces, and therein tells them, that as to the pretend
Treaties of Marriage or Exchange, 'tis so gross an In-
vention (une fourbe si grossiere) that there is no Man
who understands any thing of Affairs, but must know
wou'd be as great Imprudence as Perfidiousness to ha-
ken to any such Propositions; and tho' there be no room
for them to doubt of the Assurances which the King
Ministers had already given them, yet lays he, I pro-
test a-new to your Lordships upon my Life and my
Honour.

onour, that they are Falsities, maliciously invented by
 the Enemy ; and I submit my self to lose both, if on the
 part of France any ear has been given to any thing of
 this kind, or any Negotiation has been enter'd into. Af-
 so solemn a Declaration, the good Ambassador thinks
 but just, that the Authors of this Imposture shou'd
 punish'd in an exemplary manner, for daring to at-
 tack with their Calumnies the Faith and Reputation of a
 great King. And have we not great Reason to take the
 word of a Minister of France, when they are our Enem-
 ies who cou'd deceive in this solemn manner those
 whom at that time they were in League with ? Others
 may have a good Opinion of French Faith if they please,
 and think the Protestations of Torcy or Polignac of more
 weight, than what a whole Congress of our Allies tell
 ; for my part, I shall always remember Servien, who
 used this scandalous part not as Servien, but as the Am-
 bassador of France, for the same King, and for the same
 cause, we are now treating with and guarding against.
 There is nothing so false, I can't think this Prince and
 Ministers capable of, that can help them to give the
 finishing Stroke to their Project, when they cou'd violate
 their Faith in so infamous a manner, to give the first Be-
 ginnings to it. And I confess 'tis a great Surprise to me,
 think we shou'd not in this be all of the same Mind.
 But some Men, it seems, were in so much haste, for
 peace, that they cou'd not bear the Disappointment ;
 they had work to be done, that wou'd not stay ; and yet
 wou'd not without a Peace conveniently be carry'd on.
 The want they had of a Peace made them too easily be-
 lieve there wou'd be one ; and their impatience to be do-
 ing wou'd not let them wait till they cou'd be sure : they
 were so fond of their leap, that they were resolv'd to
 take it in the dark ; they find themselves plung'd so deep,
 they don't know which way to turn themselves, or how
 get out, and then are angry there is not a Peace, and
 wou'd fain lay the Fault on others right or wrong, to ex-
 cuse what they have brought upon themselves. In truth
 was a very great Dilemma these Gentlemen were under :
 was very much for their Purpose, to have the Ferment
 the

the Nation is in, and a Peace, no matter what sort one, come both together. The Ferment they are possession of, the Peace is a little doubtful; what now shall they do? if they stay for a Peace, which would be very convenient for them, they may lose the Ferment for nothing that is so violent can last: On the other hand if they take the advantage of the Ferment, they may have the Peace. Well, 'tis resolv'd to venture, if they lose on 'tis but ruining the Nation: whereas losing the other would be the ruin of themselves. When that is the Dilemma 'tis no great Wonder such Men shou'd choose the side to have; Self weighs more with them than a whole Nation whom they vainly think they cannot only make blind to keep so, and hope to Skreen themselves from their Ressentment by setting them upon those who never did them any harm, but have steddy purſ'd their true Interests.

But if a Nation can't fee, they can't feel; and time may come, when they, who are now so angry with the late M— that there is no Peace, may find it more than they can do, to excuse themselves for bringing a Nation into a necessity of submitting to an ill one. Who People have been long well in their Affairs, they may contract such an Insensibility of the good Condition they are in, as to be persuaded they are ill; but when the Affairs go very ill, 'tis not in the power of words to make them believe they go well; and there's nothing can prevent this, nothing can save the Nation from the dangers some Men wou'd bring it into, and them from whose fear, they deserve for it, but the unshaken Constancy, and wearied Endeavours of those very Men, whom they daily load with the blackest Calumnies, and treat in barbarous a manner, as if they never thought they could be us'd ill enough.

But to return to the Rupture of the Conferences; plain they broke off, because the French wou'd not agree to the Allies the Restitution of Spain and the Indies and 'tis as plain, the French ought to have done this 'tis what they promis'd from the beginning, and undertook for at the opening of these Conferences, the Proposal of a Partition being incapable of any other fair Construction,

action : and therefore the blame of the Rupture can only lie upon the French, or on those who have encourag'd them to act thus, by discovering the mighty haste they were in for Peace. For whether the French, when they first began these Conferences, intended they shou'd act as they did, may possibly be a question. I must own, when I heard they had propos'd a Partition, I thought the necessity of their Affairs had at last forc'd them to be sincere, and that they wou'd have struck up a Peace before Doway was taken, that the Allies might not extend their Conquests beyond the bounds of their Preliminaries. And perhaps, even after this they might balance themselves, and were for some time irresolute, with regard to consent, or not consent to the Allies, as they stand themselves pres'd by the War. And cou'd the King of M_____ have either beat their Army, or besieged Arras, I believe they wou'd have thought, the King might with Honour have abandon'd his Grandson, after he had sacrific'd so much for the Support of him ; and the safety of France wou'd have excus'd to all the World quitting Spain : And it was with this view principally they kept their Ministers so long at Gertruydenborg, till they might be upon the spot, to clap up a Peace immediately, if there shou'd be occasion. By this they were to have an Advantage in case of a Battle, which either way it turn'd ; for if they lost it, they wou'd have been able to prevent the fatal Consequences of a great Victory, by closing with the Terms of the Allies, before the victory cou'd be pursued ; and if they had won it, they wou'd have made use of the first Consternation, which the loss of a Battle wou'd have put the Dutch into, to force them to a Peace in their Terms. That this was the intent the French meant by these Conferences, is evident from what was doing at the same time in Spain. I have receiv'd before, that either the Spaniards or we must be conquer'd ; and therefore the French kept it in their Power by the most artful Ways they cou'd, to do either as they found most convenient ; but that the King's Inclination and Interest were too well known, to leave room for Doubt, that he wou'd keep his Promise to the Spaniards, if he cou'd. Accordingly we see, he did not only enable

enable his Grandson, as I have observ'd before; to bring Spain into the best Posture of Defense 'twas capable, and supply him with every thing that was necessary; he promis'd to make the Siege of Girone early in the Spring, and was making a new Offensive and Defensive Treaty with him, during these very Conferences. And the assurance and assurances the D. of Anjou had given him made him think of nothing less than quitting Spain. In the Spring he pretended to have an Army of 122 Battalions, and 145 Squadrons; besides the Troops that were coming to him from Flanders. Before the Conferences began, the King receiv'd an Express from his Grandson to acquaint him with the Zeal the Castilians express'd him, and his Resolution to stand by them; and the French Minister at Madrid in April gave ou', that the Conferences were broke off. At the same time the D. of Anjou was hastening to put himself at the Head of his Army, but was stop'd by the Affair of the D. de Medina Sidonia, which, as great a Mystery as it is, was probably at bottom a French Trick. 'Twas very natural for the Spaniards to take Umbrage at the Conferences, and to think it was time to take care of themselves; and that if they shou'd in earnest abandon them, 'twas to no purpose to adhere to his Grandson. To feel their Power upon this point, 'tis probable the French Ministers, either Belcour or Ibberville, or some others of their Emissaries pretended to treat with some of the Grandees upon Foot, and acquainted them that the King's Affairs would not permit him to support his Grandson any longer, that the King did not expect they shoud ruin themselves to maintain him on the Throne, since in that case it would be impracticable; but that if they wou'd dispose him to resign, the King would endeavour to get some Partition for him. 'Tis extremely probable, this Trick was at Madrid, to find how the Grandees were inclin'd to act on this occasion; the Duke de Medina Sidonia who was the first Minister; and that when they got out of him the Sense of him and his Friends on this nice Subject, the use they made of it, was to bring him to the D. of Anjou: and possibly the thing went further, and that in concert with the French, to save the King.

to King's Honour, they had agreed to seize his Person and
ble. lay him off; which I remember was the first Report
y; he had, upon that Minister's Disgrace. After this Af-
spine was over, which had sufficiently incited the Spa-
Treas'ards, the D. of Anjou left Madrid, and joind his Ar-
eal near Lerida. And the D. de Noailles was advanced
n his the Banks of the Ter, the River Girone stands upon, to
in, your his Designs. In June, the D. of Anjou was so far-
Bat- tine, that he made no doubt of being able to drive
ut We Charles out of Catalonia that Campaign, especially
aces- the D. de Noailles oon'd but make the Siege of Girone:
and his appears at large in some Letters of his that were
tress- receiv'd, to the King and the Duke of Burgundy, writ
the Fr- Congratulate the Marriage of the Duke of Berry, which
confer shews himself not at all please'd with. Upon his Dis-
? As pointment in Catalonia, when he could neither attack
An- Ateschal Staromberg, nor besiege Balaguer, he grew dis-
a Co- tisfy'd with his Spanish Generals: and in July both
bott- and his French sollicit the King in very pressing terms,
pania- send the Duke of Vendome to him; which was soon
hink- imply'd with, and that the D. might have no appre-
of the nitions of the King's designing to abandon him, he en-
pose- pose into a new Alliance with him. This Alliance was
ir P- forming while the Ministers of France were at Gerken-
ers, ci- berg, which place they left but the 25th; and the 8th
ries- August, or before, the Articles of this new Treaty were
open- own publicly at Paris: which makes it plain to a
s was monstrosity, that this Treaty was forming before the
ger, con- aferences were broke off.

From this Account 'tis exceeding evident that the French
it wo- are taking the most effectual Methods to support the Duke of
se him Anjou, and make the Spaniards faithful to him; while they
Partie- are persuading the Allies, the King would in earnest aban-
was to- don him, and give him no assistance directly, or indirectly; as
clin'd- they were making ready for him, upon which they would
tticu- urge him to resign. And if this be not infallible in the last De-
they- cades, I would be glad to know, what is? If he was sincere,
o be- did he treat for a general Peace, when he either would
vent- nor could not make the necessary Consideration of it: particu-
save- larly, Why, when he meant nothing but a separate Peace, did he
Kin- E

nor frankly from the begining tell the Allies, that he was willing to make Terms with them for himself, but that he could make none for Spain ? Was this for any thing else but to amuse the Allies, who he knew would flesly have resolv'd entering in any Negotiations, if he had spoke out plainly what he meant ? Did not he intend from the beginning, to defeat by an Excuse, a general Peace, while he pretended all the while to desire it ? as old Managers sometimes do with a Bill in parliament, which they contrive should be lost by an Amendment, while they would be thought zealous for it ; which they would not have been able to effect, had they openly declar'd against the Bill it self. Thus they gain the Point they would have, seeming to be for, what in truth they would not have; and in the same Part the King of France has acted with respect to Peace, but not yet with the same Success. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a separate Peace, by effecting to treat for a General one ; which he would of all things keep off. A Man must shut his Eyes very hard, not to see the French meaning something by these Conferences but to amuse the Allies, and keep in their power to make what use of them they should have occasion for ; and that they never design'd to consent to what was necessary to make a General Peace practicable : They either meant no Peace at all, or only a separate one for themselves ; which hap'd from the Temper of the Dutch, the Nature of their Government, and the Experience they have formerly had of them which might be frightened into : To which end they affected from very first Conference, to let nothing fall from them that might look like a Desire to retard the Operations of the Campaign on their own Part threatened what mighty things they would do upon the Rhine and in Spain ; and to intimidate them the Maréchal Villars condescended to the mean Artifice of writing to the French Ministers, from time to time, Letters filled with grossest Gasconade, what a brave Army he had ; how dangerous they were to come to an Engagement, and that if the Allies had a mind to a Battle, they should meet with no Interruptions, but should find him ready to receive them in an open plain. These poor Tricks they fancy'd would pass upon Dutch Deputies : But they were too well known to be believed ; the Event shew'd there was nothing else in all these Boxes aimed at, but to deceive : for the minute Doway began to

will
 could all his might, and dur'd not offer them Battle all the rest
 of the Campaign, tho' more Battalions had been weaken'd by the
 Sieges of Douay and Bethune, than the Battle of Blenheim
 was fought with; and almost as many more were afterwards
 the same time employ'd in the Sieges of St Venant and Aire.
 These and all the other Artifices of France cou'd not delude
 the States to quit the common Interest, or induce the
 Spaniards to bearken to a separate Peace with the French, who they
 were taking the most effectual means to make the Reduction
 of Spain impossible, while they were treating of Terms for
 Surrender of it. But nothing can discover more plainly the
 sincerity of France, than what happen'd after these Confe-
 rences were ended: Two Days after their Plenipotentiaries
 were gone, the Duke of Anjou receiv'd a considerable Disgrace
 at Llmenara, and in about three Weeks after that his Army
 intirely Defeated at Saragossa, beyond a possibility of main-
 taining his Grounds, or recovering his Affairs without the Assi-
 stance of France. Here now was a fair Occasion for the French
 to shew himself; his Language had been all along, that
 he wou'd not be active to destronc his Grandson, but would con-
 siderately so abandon him, if that would procure a Peace.
 Allies can't take his bare Word; his Ministers make the
 solemn Pro'fessions in his Name, and give repeated As-
 surances of this in the most express Words, and complain be-
 that they are not believed. Now in less than a Month after
 conferences were ended, there happens the best Opportunity in
 the World for the King to shew his great Sincerity, the Obstruc-
 tion to a Peace, is the Evacuation of Spain. Let now the King
 keep his Word, and be passive only, and the thing will do it
 self: the Allies can't fail of Spain, if the King does not sup-
 port his Grandson against them. What part now does the
 King take? Does he send to the Allies that he will abandon
 his Grandson in Earnest, if that will content them? Nothing
 can be ballances indeed for some time what to do, and
 frequent Councils; but for what? Not because he has
 doubt, whether he shou'd act agreeably to his Word, or
 be sincere: for that I have already observ'd he cou'd
 be must deceive either us or the Spaniards. All the
 therefore was, which he shou'd do: at first their Affairs
 seem'd

Seem'd to be in so desparate a Condition, as to be beyond recovery; and that all the Support he cou'd give his Grandson wou'd be insignificant; and therefore, there were some thoughts of making a Virtue of Necessity, and to procure a Peace to France, abandoning Spain, since, if he did not abandon it, it wou'd be lost. And had the Action of Saragossa happen'd a Month sooner, it's very likely it had prov'd so; for the Hands of the French were too full of other Work to send any considerable Forces to Spain, till the Campaign was in other parts, Savoy particularly, drawing to an end. After many Consultations, 'tis resolved to make the utmost Efforts to support the Duke of Anjou notwithstanding all their Pretences to leave him to himself, rather to persuade him to quit a Kingdom which, without their Help, all the World sees he cou'd not have kept.

What succe's this Assistance, that has been given him, has had, I need not tell you; nor what further mischiefs the common Cause is like to suffer from it. 'Tis greatly to be pitied the Conferences did not last one Month longer, which wou'd have put the French under a Necessity of keeping their Word, or in the most infamous manner breaking it, to support a Cause they had so often, and with so much seeming Earnestness promis'd to renounce. As it is, there is but one Excuse for them, which those who are arguing against, had rather shou'd not be made; and that is, to plead that the Case is alter'd, Affairs are not in the same Condition they were in, when they made their Promises. They have a Political Observatory at Paris, where the Marquis de Torcy, and the French Minister frequently examine what Appearances there are in the Heavens of all the Countries in War with them, and according to these they take their Measures of War or Peace; and 'tis by this they justify their Assisting the Duke of Anjou. What past in Spain the 20th of August, they thought sufficiently ballanc'd by what happen'd to the North-West of them the 19th. What preceded that Confirmation, and has since follow'd it, has determin'd the French not only to support the Duke of Anjou, but to desist for the present from all further Offers of Peace, which we are as much plung'd into the War as we were seven Years ago, and there seems no remedy for it but

at is worse than the Disease, an ill Peace. For the
Truth of which I shall refer you to your own Reflecti-
on upon all the News we have had for these four Months
from Paris, and to what is as good a Proof as all the
rest, to a Letter of the Elector of Bavaria's Minister to
the Master, a Piece of which you have in the MEDLEY
of the first of this Month; which some People wou'd be
bold to prove, is not so genuine as they know it is.
Some People indeed wou'd still pretend to put a good Face
on the Matter, and do not question from the D— of
past Successes, that he will yet frighten our En-
emies into an honourable Peace. But I must beg their
ardon, if I can't be of their Opinion. I am afraid he is
not likely to do so much at this time, when the Enemy
encourag'd to take heart afresh, the Allies are full of
jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd;
things are not the same, any more than the usage he
meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, under-
lain'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vailly misre-
presented to the People; when his want of Interest at
home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the
Hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority an
Army, where 'tis made criminal to espouse his Interests
and to fly in his Face is the surest means to Advanc-
ement; when 'tis meritorious in his Officers to cabal against
him, and the most factious will be thought the most de-
riving. With what heart can a Man in these Circumstan-
ces serve? Or what Succes can be expected from him,
when he is to depend upon profess'd Enemies for his
support? 'Tis little, I think, we can hope for even from
him hereafter, tho' that little be more than any body else
wou'd do.

But 'tis time to draw to a Conclusion of this Argu-
ment, in which I have said so much, that I flatter my
self I may be allow'd, not as a Favour but common Justice,
to conclude from it, That nothing can be more false and
groundless than the malicious Aspersions of these Men,
who without the least regard to Truth, Honour or good
Conscience, tell the World that the D— of N — in
conjunction with the late Ministry, was for perpetuating
the

the War. If they shou'd describe the D— of M—
 to be a short, black, fattish, red-fac'd, ill-shap'd Man
 that loves to drink hard, never speaks to be understood,
 is extremely revengeful and ill-bred; if they shou'd
 present his Mind to be a Complication of all ill Qua-
 lies, and his Body to be the Image of Deformity, 'twou-
 be as like him as the Picture those Gentlemen draw
 him. Nothing can be more ridicu'ous and absurd, than
 accuse of a Design to perpetuate the War, a Man who
 in every respect out-gone our Wishes, and has done more
 towards a good Peace, by his own Conduct, Address and
 Ability, both in War and Peace, by his Conduct in the
 Field, by his Interest with the Allies, by his happy Tem-
 per to prevent or make up Differences, by his Dexteri-
 ty and Wisdom, by his great Humanity and Sweetness of Be-
 haviour which is peculiar to him, by his Zeal for the
 Honour of the QUEEN, whom he has serv'd with more
 Affection than most Men ever did a Mistress; and by his
 true Concern for the Good of his Country, and the Liberty
 of Europe, in which he has few Equals. By these ad-
 mirable Qualities, which so eminently shine in him, he
 has done more towards a good Peace than all those that
 find fault with him, ever did or will do, put them all to-
 gether: he has struck such a Terror into the Enemy, and
 preserv'd so perfect a Harmony among our Allies, tha-
 nothing, humanly speaking cou'd have destroy'd our Hope
 of a good Peace, but the Endeavours that have been us-
 to destroy him. What Villany then was it to try by C-
 lumnies and Lyes to ruin him, who cou'd not sink with-
 out drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him? And
 'tis that Consideration makes me express my self with so
 much warmth. For as for the Duke himself, he defies the
 feeble Efforts they make against him; their Malice may add
 to his Glory, by giving fresh Matter for him to shew the
 World how great a Man he is under all Tryals, but can la-
 stingly take nothing from it: for Time will dissipate the
 thickest Mist with which his Glory may be overcast, and
 the malicious Attacks of Envy and Faction may very soon
 turn upon themselves; and at worst Posterity will be-
 just, and his Name will be immortal and live for ever.

Esteem, while the Writers of Scandal, and their Masters are either bury'd in Oblivion, or remembred with Infamy and Detestation. 'Tis not therefore the Person of Duke of M—— I'm concern'd for; but for the connexion which the Fate of this poor Nation, of ouries, of all Europe, has with his. 'Tis the Prospect of ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and dismal Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with it: 'tis this disturbs me; and 'tis indeed this, only this, disturbs him: for were the Glory of the KINGE secur'd, and the Safety of his Country fix'd by a safe and honourable Peace, what cou'd be so desirable to him as to retire and leave the Theatre of Businesse to men, who want so much to have it all to themselves, and if he were gone off of it? In which, he wou'd before now have prevented their Impatience, if the publick Service did not want him: but such is the hard Fate of this great Man, that they can neither bear his Company, nor without him; they know not how to let him either leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they wou'd have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themselves, and all Effects of their own ill Management wou'd have been upon him, as if his quitting had been the sole cause of it; and we shou'd have heard nothing but Invective & Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, after such ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. But how base and unjust is this? for with what comfort can he continue in a Command under a Nation of doing his Country service, when all possibility of serving well is taken from him? What rotting is left in that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is sure ill Success will be made a time, and good Success from him they had rather be without? What Service then is it they pretend to expect from him? Or what do they mean, by seeming desirous he should continue in his Command? I tremble with Indignation as I write to think how strangely some Men act, who would confound all things to serve themselves, and can

can bear no Virtue, that stands in the way of their Signs; be it never so useful to the World, or be the Interest of their Country never so closely interwoven with it. But they tell us, we need be in no Pain for our Country. There is a certain Sett of Men, the Oracle of Party says, they are sure will use all proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace. Will they? Is no more, let but the Event make good their Words, I'll forgive them all the rest. But what Means are they to be, or what Peace are we to expect from them? What these Means will be from these Words I can't guess, but can tell you what they will not be; they must not such as have been already us'd, for this is said in opposition to those who were for perpetuating the War. Now the Means they us'd, who are accus'd of this, were these: they kept things quiet at Home, took the most effectual Methods to support Credit, carry'd on the War with Vigour, and maintain'd a good Correspondence with Allies, that the common Enemy might find no room for Jealousies or make Divisions. Quiet, Unity, Credit, Vigour, Harmony, these were the Means the last used to perpetuate the War: I leave you then to judge what Means those must be, that we are now told we are in Opposition to these, be us'd to put an End to it.

But I'll venture to foretel thus much of them, that no proper means they can't use, no nor so proper, unless they will condescend to use the same; and the same if they had a means to use, they can't, 'tis too late, they are not to be had. What then are we to expect, should be the end of such improper means? Or how shall we come to a Safe and Honourable Peace; If the means they use, be contrary to those that have been already us'd, we can have no Peace, none that is safe or honourable: For let them remember, no Peace is so, without Spain and the Indies. Either the Queen and Parliament and Nation, and the whole Body of the Allies, have been in Nine years mightily in the wrong, who think these necessary to a good Peace; or they are so, who think any Peace can be good without them. Let them remember, 'tis all one whether we suffer France to keep Possession, whether by formal Treaty, or by a separate Peace; which can hardly

These two Consequences, to bring the whole
eight of a Spanish War upon England and be
last forc'd to quit what we have been at for
so dear Expence of Blood and Treasure so many
Years contending for; as I have shewn you at
large in my last Letter. And that is not the
worst of it: If we give Spain and the Indies
to the King of France, he will be sure to give
us as good a thing for it, a Prince bred from
the Cradle in Bigotry and Tyranny; Italian
Bigotry, and French Tyranny, the two great
Plagues under the Sun; Plagues we de-
serve to suffer if we think them none, or re-
sent not of the Pains we have been at to keep
them out. This will infallibly be the Conse-
quence of leaving Spain and the Indies to
France, nor perhaps presently; unless it be
contriv'd to make it an Article in the next
Treaty, which 'tis very easy to bring about
by an ill War; but 'tis all one, if it be deferr'd
little, till the French have taken Breath,
and are at leisure, after finishing their own vast
designs, to take care of us, for whom they
have always had a particular regard, and will
be the first good Opportunity to ruin us:
or the Pretender, no doubt, will remember
King James's dying Advice, never to quit his
religion, and always to look on the King of
France as his Father. And I hope we shall al-
ways remember, his Father gave him that Ad-
vice; which is utterly inconsistent with our

Civil and Religious Rights; and if it be the order
 place, can end in nothing but the Ruin
 this Nation. If not to come into such a Peace
 be to perpetuate the War, may it still be per-
 petuated. If such Means and such an End, be
 meant by the proper Means to promote a true
 and honourable Peace, I don't wonder, that
 can't like the D--- of M---- they must find
 another General, and another Plenipotentiary,
 since he will never be for their turn.
 He has gain'd too much Honour by the War,
 and espous'd too far the true Interest of his
 Country, to promote an ill Peace, or make way
 for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can
 please these Gentlemen, will never purchase
 their Favour and Applause, at the Expence of
 his own Glory and the Nation's Safety; to say
 nothing of the common Cause, which nothing
 will prevail with him to betray. But I should
 never have done, if I were to go whither the
 Pursuit of these Reflections would lead me. I
 shall therefore, without saying more, content
 my self with having prov'd my Point, which I
 hope I have done, to the Satisfaction of any one,
 who knows enough of Affairs to judge of them,
 and is honest enough to be impartial; such a
 Man I know you to be, who will, I make no
 doubt, own your self convinc'd, that nothing
 can be more groundless than the Calumnies that
 have been thrown upon the D--- of M---- and
 his Friends, that the War has been ill manag'd.

order to perpetuate it. If what I have said
true, nothing can be more unjust and absurd,
these Imputations. And I shall content
self with having shewn this, without en-
quiring what can be the meaning of all those
cious Lyes, who they come from, what
pose they are design'd to serve, or what

Offence the D-- of M-- has given these
n; since the things they pretend to accuse
n of, are all Chimerical and Imaginary. But
atever it be they mean, 'tis the D-- of M--'s
ppiness under all these Disadvantages to serve
Queen, who knows how to put a juster Va-
on the Zeal and Conduct he has shewn for
e Support and Honour of her Reign; who
ows, that while 'tis her Pleasure, and for her
rvice he shou'd command, he will in spite,
I may add in contempt of the Use which
ne Men prepare to make of a Peace, pursue
the most effectual manner he can, the great
vances he has made towards it.

I have nothing more to add, but to assure
u, that to the best of my Knowledge, I
ve said nothing that is not true, nor con-
ld any thing that is, which cou'd give
ht to this Subject. I have made no wilful
istake in any part, much less any material
e in what concerns the main questions: as
any little Inaccuracies, especially in what
ates to the Negotiations, considering the
Se-

Secrecy they have been manag'd with,
 that I write from a place, where I have
 help either from papers or Conversation,
 shall hope to find an easy pardon from you,
 since if these papers prove nothing else, I
 sure you will allow they prove this, that I
 with the greatest Truth, and most per-
 EReem,

S. I. R.

Your most faithful

humble Servt

FINIS.